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The Politics of Educational Exchange:
Turkish Education in Eurasia
LERNA K. YANIK
THIS ARTICLE ASSESSES THE ROLE of educational exchange as a foreign policy tool.1 It
investigates public and private educational ties that were established between Turkey
and Turkic populations of Eurasia, including the Turkic republics of the former Soviet
Union after 1991—a period which is considered to be the beginning of a new era in
Turkish foreign policy making.2 After spending the Cold War as a buffer state,
Turkey felt the need to redefine its role in the international arena in the aftermath of
the Cold War. The emergence of the Turkic republics played an important role in this
redefinition process.
This redefinition included the highlighting of Turkey’s common ethnic bonds,
especially with the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union. Turkey emphasised
common history and traditions, attempted to create a common alphabet, and further-
more created and reorganised certain institutions that worked to highlight this ethnic
commonality. Educational ties established especially with the Turkic republics and
with countries in the Balkans and Eurasia were an important part of this cultural
reorientation policy pursued by the Turkish state.
The highlighting of these common ethnic bonds in the early 1990s was quite
unusual for Turkey and the Turkish elites, since it was something that had not been
done openly since the last days of the Ottoman Empire. In the early 1920s, when
establishing the Turkish Republic, and afraid of angering the Soviet Union, the
founding fathers of modern Turkey opted not to associate the country, at least in the
political sense, with the Turkic groups that had become part of the newly established
USSR. Despite this political dissociation, official Turkish history, which was rewritten
in the early days of modern Turkey, nevertheless kept the link to the Turkic Republics
of the former Soviet Union by accepting Turkistan, the geographical area that mostly
corresponds to today’s Turkic republics in Central Asia, as the ancestral homeland of
the Turks in Turkey. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, after an
almost 70-year gap, Turkish elites began to re-establish the long-forgotten political
ties with the Turkic republics. These political ties were full of nuances that aimed
to underline the common ethnic ground that Turkey and the Turkic republics
shared.
Education was and still is an important part of this cultural reorientation policy
developed by Turkey. Very much like the educational campaign modern Turkey
embarked upon in the early days of the Republic to create the ‘Turk’, this second
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educational campaign had two very important goals. Turkish elites, very optimisti-
cally, thought that educating today’s students meant creation of the elites who later
would be in charge of the transformation towards a market economy and democracy
in their countries.3 More importantly, however, the goal was to create a stratum of
people who would be well versed in Turkish culture and language, which then would
act as a bridge between their countries and Turkey. The students coming out of this
educational experience were expected to bear the ‘Turkic identity’ that the Turkish
elites thought was in the making since the Turkic republics gained their independence
in 1991. In other words, like many scholars who previously highlighted the link
between education and identity,4 Turkish officials were quick to realise the import-
ance of education as a powerful mechanism of identity creation and social change. As
one former Turkish minister of national education stated:
These children, during their education, will get the chance to know their Turkish friends
closely and thus will become the foundation stones for the common cause. Furthermore,
when they return to their countries after finishing their education, they will become the
architects of the great Turkish world …5
In terms of educational exchange there were two main trends. The first was that
students, especially at the university level, were invited to study in Turkey on
scholarships distributed by the Turkish state. Second, there were educational institu-
tions, mostly at the secondary education level, established in the Turkic Republics of
the former Soviet Union and Eurasia by the Turkish Ministry of Education and by
various foundations, especially ones known to have ties to the Nurcu community of
Fetullah Gülen. The involvement of the Nurcu community as a non-state actor in this
educational exchange indicates a degree of delegation in the process of creating a
collective Turkic identity. This is an interesting point because the Turkish state most
of the time preferred to keep a tight monopoly on culture and national identity issues.
Overall, when considered as a whole, from the perspective of the Turkish state, all
these educational exchange ties, both public and private, can be regarded as a
long-term investment. The success of this investment will only be determined in the
coming decades.
The students from Eurasia
Educational exchange, especially inviting students from the Turkic Republics as well
as from Eurasia, was one of the top priorities of Turkish officials from the early days.
These students were seen as the foundation stones of the ‘Turkish Renaissance’ or as
part of the modernisation of the ‘Turkish World’ in the twenty-first century.6 Labeled
the ‘Great Student Exchange Project’, the aim, as stated briefly before, was to educate
the future generation of elites of the newly independent states in Eurasia. To this end,
starting in the 1992–93 academic year, the Turkish state offered 7,000 higher
education scholarships and 3,000 secondary school scholarships to students from the
Turkic Republics and approximately 1,000 scholarships to students from Eurasian
countries. In the first year of this Great Student Exchange Project, of the 10,000
scholarships that were offered, students coming from the Turkic Republics accepted
4,879 higher education scholarships and 1,659 high school scholarships.7 When
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distributing all these scholarships, in order to show that these countries were equally
important for Turkey, the Turkish Ministry of National Education was very careful to
allocate equal numbers of scholarships (2,000 per country).8
In addition to inviting students on scholarship to Turkey, Turkey also offered
various training programmes and seminars. For example, following a protocol signed
by the ministers of foreign affairs, Turkey also started to train diplomats from the
Turkic Republics in 1992. This was a training programme that also included several
months of training in the Turkish language.9 Between 1992 and 1998 a total of 297
diplomats were trained. This number included diplomats from the Turkic Republics
as well as diplomats from countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, and Ukraine.10
There were also two-week seminars that aimed to introduce Turkish culture and the
national education system to teachers from the Turkic Republics and various Turkish
communities. The total number of trainees who took part in these seminars between
1995 and 1999 was 910.11
Furthermore, to handle these scholarships and the student traffic, the Turkish
Ministry of National Education established the Department of Overseas Education
within the ministry in May 1992. While the ministry stated that ‘providing educa-
tional assistance for citizens and their children living abroad’ was the primary goal of
this newly established department, the duties of the department also included ‘to
develop educational cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic Republics’.12
Inviting students on scholarships to Turkey, however, did not always operate
smoothly. It had inherent problems that the Turkish elites themselves also acknowl-
edged. These problems eventually led to a decrease in the number of students who
came to study in Turkey. The first and foremost problem was economic. The amount
of money that Turkey spent for students and their scholarships was not enough to
cover all costs adequately. There were criticisms that Turkey had invited more
students than it could handle, and thus the scholarships were too small and often were
not paid on time.13 The Turkish Ministry of National Education, quite self-critically,
was well aware of the insufficiency of these scholarships and stipends as early as
1993.14 Second, there were criticisms that the Turkish authorities were not paying
serious attention to the selection of students coming from the Turkic Republics and
other Turkish and Turkic communities elsewhere. Turkey, according to this line of
argument, had chosen quantity over quality, i.e. had opted for bringing the average
student rather than the best and the brightest. This was considered a reason for the
high drop-out rate and limited the chance of success of the project from the beginning.
Former Turkish President Süleyman Demirel, in a 1998 interview, claimed that
Turkey was paying the utmost attention to this selection process. The Turkish
authorities, he argued, initially had aimed for a 50% degree completion rate and now
the rate was around 70%, with which they were quite content.15
Finally, tension between Turkey and Uzbekistan became one of the reasons leading
to a decrease in the number of students from the Turkic Republics. Soon after the
electoral victory of the Welfare Party in 1996, the Uzbek government claimed that
some members of the Welfare Party and Uzbek dissidents living in Turkey were
trying to turn Uzbek students in Turkey into ‘Islamic fundamentalists’.16 Conse-
quently, the Uzbek government, which in September 1994 had been ‘calling on
Turkey to educate [its] students’,17 withdrew 1,298 students in 1997. Moreover, the
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TABLE 1
STUDENTS ON SCHOLARSHIP IN TURKEY FROM EURASIA, 1997–2002
1997 1999 2000 2001 2002
Azerbaijan 1,793 1,169 815 630 616
Kazakhstan 1,178 775 669 625 617
Kyrgyzstan 804 762 814 721 699
Uzbekistan 438 195 10 6 3
Turkmenistan 2,226 1,368 1,186 970 822
Asian countries 1,710 1,613 1,553 1,384 1,283
Balkan countries 1,396 1,543 1,558 1,701 1,611
Total 9,545 7,425 6,605 6,037 5,651
Source: Compiled from data available at www.meb.gov.tr, accessed 10 Sep-
tember 2003.
Uzbek government blamed Turkey for harbouring Uzbek dissidents, some of whom
were accused of plotting an assassination against the Uzbek President, Islam Kari-
mov, in February 1999.18 This further increased tensions between Turkey and
Uzbekistan and, as Table 1 indicates, another 243 students were withdrawn between
1997 and 1999, bringing the total number of Uzbek students in Turkey to 195. By
October 2002, according to Turkish Ministry of National Education statistics, there
were only three Uzbek students left studying in Turkey.19
The Turkish government, however, denied that Uzbek dissidents were being
harboured in Turkey20 and that the Uzbek government was withdrawing its students.
Prime Minister Ecevit, for instance, rejected the allegations that the withdrawals were
related to ‘fundamentalism’. He stated that the Uzbek students were being withdrawn
due to ‘unnecessarily created distrust’.21 Ahat Andican, Minister in Charge of
Relations with Turkic Republics, stated that
There was no such withdrawal whatsoever. When the protocol about educating 10,000
students in Turkey was signed in 1994, the Uzbek government stated that they would use
this quota as they needed. So, there never have been 2,000 Uzbek students in Turkey and
now [August 1997] there are 400.22
However, although there were no other major tensions between other Turkic
Republics and Turkey, there was an overall decrease in the numbers of students
coming to Turkey. As Table 1 shows, the decreasing number of students indicates a
loss of momentum in the Great Student Exchange Project after 1997. With the
exception of students coming from the Balkan countries, there has been a decline in
the number of students coming from all of the Turkic republics and other Asian
countries. Overall, while the total number of students in Turkey in 1997 was 9,545,
this number dropped to 6,037 in 2001 and 5,651 in 2002.
Table 2 puts the total number of scholarships distributed to students from Eurasia
including the Turkic republics between 1992 and 2002 as 21,871. During this period,
of the 21,871 scholarships distributed, 11,017 were revoked, marking the success rate
as approximately 50%.
However, these numbers conflict with those from another report prepared by the
Turkish Ministry of National Education. According to this report, which appeared in
2001, the total number of students who came to Turkey from the Turkic Republics
TURKISH EDUCATION IN EURASIA 297
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF SCHOLARSHIPS DISTRIBUTED AND REVOKED, 1992–2002
Scholarships Scholarships Number of
Countries distributed revoked graduates
Azerbaijan 3,195 1,467 1,102
Kazakhstan 2,691 1,463 611
Kyrgyzstan 1,987 958 330
Uzbekistan 1,981 1,705 273
Turkmenistan 4,235 1,850 1,563
Asian countries 3,960 2,125 552
Balkan countries 3,822 1,449 762
Total 21,871 11,017 5,193
Source: Compiled from the Turkish Ministry of National Education Website, http://www.meb.gov.tr/
stats/apk2003/icindekilersayisalveriler2003.pdf, accessed 10 September 2003.
and the Turkish/Turkic communities on scholarship between 1992 and 1999 was
17,995, the number of graduates was 3,169, and the number who left without
completing their degrees (including the students withdrawn by Uzbekistan) was
7,401.23 In early 1995, for example, of the 11,437 students who came to Turkey from
the Turkic Republics and other Turkic/Turkish communities, approximately 2,500 had
already returned to their countries without completing their degrees.24 A report that
appeared in the newspaper Milliyet painted a direr picture. According to this report,
of the 18,690 students who came to Turkey, only (approximately) 3,000 were able to
get their degrees; for various reasons, 9,000 of them had lost their scholarships and
2,300 had simply dropped out without completing their degrees. Again, according to
this report, most of these 2,300 students who dropped out ended up not returning to
their own countries and many of them took employment illegally in Turkey.25 In June
2001, however, Abdulhaluk Çay, the Minister in Charge of Relations with the Turkic
States, put the total number of students who came to Turkey on scholarships as
19,000, the total number of graduates as 4,500, and the current number of students in
Turkey as 13,000, with 1,300–1,400 additional students coming to Turkey every
year.26 A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official put the total number of scholarships
distributed to students from the Turkic Republics and other Turkish communities
between 1992 and late 2001 as 20,500.27 These numbers, however, are no more than
a statistic that only gives a very rough indication of what the Turkish state has done
so far for this Great Student Exchange Project. Only time and, of course, the next
generation of elites will show whether or not Turkey will get its returns from its
long-term investment. Despite all these ups and downs, Turkey, at the moment, is still
keen on maintaining all these programmes. Former minister Çay stated that Turkey
would focus more on bringing students at the graduate level to Turkey and would
slowly improve conditions for these students by establishing help desks in major
cities.28 Likewise, in December 2001, during budget discussions in the Turkish Grand
National Assembly, İsmail Cem, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, reiterated the
importance of this educational exchange both for Turkey and for the countries in
Eurasia and stated that
In order to be able to expedite the transition to democracy and to market economy in the
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TABLE 3
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, AND TURKISH LANGUAGE TEACHING
CENTRES ESTABLISHED IN EURASIA BY THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF NATIONAL
EDUCATION, 2001–2002 ACADEMIC YEAR
Schools Students TLTC TLTC students
Azerbaijan 2 452 1 40
Kazakhstan – 101 2 101
Kyrgyzstan 3 698 1 480
Uzbekistan 1 98 – –
Turkmenistan 2 999 2 399
Tajikistan – 97 1 97
Moldova 1 76 – –
Total 9 2,521 7 1,117
Source: MEB Istatistik 2003, http://www.meb.gov.tr/stats/apk2003/icindekil-
ersayisalveriler2003.pdf, accessed 10 September 2003.
Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union as well as other Turkic communities, and to
develop cultural, economic and political relations, we give special importance to the
scholarship project. We are in full coordination with the related ministries, in order to
provide the best education possible for the students who will become the ruling cadres of
their country.29
Turkish schools in the Turkic Republics and Eurasia
Part of this educational exchange consisted of institutions established at various levels
both by the Turkish Ministry of National Education and by private foundations in
Eurasia after 1991 (see Tables 3 and 4). By early 1995, as part of ‘creating the next
generation of elites’, the Turkish Ministry of National Education established four
Anatolian high schools,30 six Anatolian professional schools, two elementary schools,
three Turkish Language Teaching Centres (TLTC) and the Turk–Kazakh Hoca Ahmet
Yesevi University in Kazakhstan.31 In 1998 the Turk–Kyrgyz Manas University,
which was established with the support of the Turkish government, was added to this
list. However, private schools established especially by the Nurcu community, and to
a lesser degree by other groups like the Foundation for Research on the Turkish
World, outnumbered the schools and universities established by the Turkish Ministry
of National Education. Furthermore, the Turkish state and these private initiatives all
had a different geographical focus when establishing their respective educational
institutions. With the exception of Tajikistan and Moldova, the educational institu-
tions the Turkish state established were limited to the Turkic republics. The primary
focus of the Nurcu community was still the Turkic republics, but businessmen from
this community also established numerous educational institutions at various levels
elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent States and around the world in
countries ranging from Afghanistan to the United Kingdom. In 1998 the community
was even reported to be considering the idea of establishing a Turkish–American
University in New Jersey.32
At first sight, the greater number of private Turkish schools than state ones could
have been regarded as a ‘win-win’ situation for Turkey and the Turkish state since
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TABLE 4
NUMBER OF TURKISH PRIVATE SCHOOLS OPENED IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES
(CIS), FEBRUARY 1997
Schools Students Teachers Universities Students Academic staff
Azerbaijan 16 2,653 397 3 1,407 102
Kazakhstan 31 5,885 85 2 171 96
Kyrgyzstan 11 2,093 291 2 378 31
Uzbekistan 17 3,174 210
Turkmenistan 14 2,549 318 2 501 70
Tajikistan 5 694 107
Russian Fed.a 4 358 53
East Siberia 5 438 97
Tatarstan 8 1,798 218 2 83 30
Chuvashia 1 160 21
Karachai-Cherkessia 1 93 11
Dagestan 3 454 72 2 390 43
Bashkortostan 3 462 88
Crimea 1 181 28
Georgia 3 244 48
Ukraine 2 112 49
Moldova 2 235 40
Total 127 21,583 2,133 13 2,930 372
Note: a Excluding regions specified separately.
Source: Istatistik Turkce 97, http://www.meb.gov.tr/stats/myhtm150.htm, accessed 24 April 2001.
Turkish culture, language and education were being transported to these countries at
no cost to the Turkish state. In 1998, for example, it was estimated that 40,000
students were being taught Turkish at the schools associated with the Nurcu
community.33 These schools, especially the ones related to the Nurcu community
(which was regarded as the ‘post-modern’ face of Islam in Turkey, blending ‘Turkish
nationalism with political Islam, the idea of Islamic brotherhoods, the savoir-vivre of
the West and economic neo-liberalism’),34 offered students around Eurasia a superior
education, teaching four languages (Turkish, English, Russian and the local language)
at once along with strict discipline and respect for family (which is something very
revered in the East) in return for no or very little monetary obligation for students in
most cases. Coupled with these features, the presence of teachers who were working
with missionary zeal quickly made these institutions ‘star’ schools, in which parents
competed for the privilege of enrolling their children.35 Put differently, this was
basically third parties displaying a very positive image of Turkey, the Turks and
Turkishness. As a consequence, these schools initially gained the full approval of
Turkish officials. For example, former Turkish presidents Turgut Özal and Süleyman
Demirel were reported to have written reference letters for some of these en-
trepreneurs who established schools in Kazakhstan and Georgia.36
What was interesting in this initial ‘symbiosis’ between the Turkish state and the
Nurcu community, which is traced back to Said-i Nursi and his writings, was the
nature and the mission of Fetullah Gülen and his followers. Born in 1873, in eastern
Anatolia, Said-i Nursi’s goal, in brief, was to keep Islam away from the materialism
of the West.37 Consequently, Nursi promoted the revival of Islamic values in the late
Ottoman and early republican periods. In order to achieve this goal of Islamic revival,
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Nursi, in Şerif Mardin’s words, believed that his followers should be ‘enlight-
ened … by demonstrating the truths of religion in the manner most appropriate to the
understanding of that century’.38 In other words, from Nursi’s perspective, being a
good Muslim and reaching Islam without the influence of the West required
education, learning and mastering new sciences.39 Given the emphasis on education
in Nurcu teachings, in a sense, the idea of opening schools and universities both in
Turkey and in 53 different countries of the world was the realisation of this
‘post-modern’ approach of the Nurcu community as well as the teachings of Said-i
Nursi. These schools were spreading Turkish identity (with the Islamic side high-
lighted) with the help of a curriculum almost matching Western educational standards
at schools financed by community members whose fortunes had their roots in the
basic tenets of capitalism. However, Fetullah Gülen denied that these schools were
directly tied to him. Rather, he said, these schools belonged to his entrepreneur
followers, whom he encouraged to open schools in Turkey and elsewhere.40 Fetullah
Gülen, in a series of interviews that appeared in the newspaper Yeni Yüzyil in January
1998, explained the reasons for establishing these schools as follows:
I first sent my friends to Azerbaijan. My friends took this offer to the Azerbaijanis and the
Azerbaijanis accepted the offer. I found their interest encouraging. We said, ‘this is a good
thing’. We thought, ‘we could enter the education world [in these countries] before anybody
else … and we could fill the gap and leave no place neither for Iran nor for Turan’. People
shouldered these educational activities like they shouldered the National Independence War
[of Turkey]. … I saw the Turkish [sic] States of the former Soviet Union as oppressed and
unjustly treated. As the son of a great state, I could never digest this humiliation. Turkey is
not a small state but due to the conditions of that day, it is a state with limited abilities.41
Despite the existence of Turkish teachers, teaching Turkish language and culture,
Fetullah Gülen and his followers also rejected the idea that these schools were
preaching religion and propagating Turkish nationalism. Gülen insisted that their
educational operations were nothing more than retaliation against the missionary
activities of ‘others’.42 In his words, ‘constructing a congregation was more important
than constructing a mosque’,43 and the existence of ‘ties from the heart’, he said, was
the reason he and his followers preferred the Turkic Republics to establish their
educational enterprises.44
In other words, the Nurcu community saw themselves as lobbyists carrying
‘Turkish culture’ and ‘the idea of Turkishness’ abroad through education and the
post-modern face of Islam. In Fetullah Gülen’s words, ‘the success of these schools
was also becoming the success of Turkey’.45 Initially, this characteristic of the Nurcu
community helped to draw support from non-Nurcu businessmen engaged in business
in the former Soviet Union46 as well as Turkish statesmen.47 In November 1997, for
example, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, during a trip to Denmark, visited a school
belonging to the Nurcu community, and frequently expressed his constant support for
these schools as well as for Fetullah Gülen.48
However, two events did great damage to this ‘educational symbiosis’ between the
Turkish state and the Nurcu community. First, in February 1999 there was a failed
assassination attempt against the Uzbek President, Islam Karimov. In April 1999,
following this assassination attempt, the Uzbek government accused several Turkish
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businessmen in Uzbekistan who were claimed to be connected with the Nurcu
community of having ties to this assassination attempt,49 and closed down all schools
related to the Nurcu community, sent all teachers of Turkish nationality back to
Turkey and, according to certain reports, even barred the graduates of these schools
from attending universities in Uzbekistan.50 This was followed by the closure of six
schools and one Turkish Language Teaching Centre operated by the Turkish Ministry
of Education.51 As Table 3 indicates, in late 2002 there was only one school in
Uzbekistan operated by the Turkish Ministry of National Education, which only
students of Turkish nationality attended.
While relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan turned sour soon after the incident
in Uzbekistan, another event took place in Turkey that raised doubts about the
‘post-modern’ intentions of the Nurcu community. In June 1999 secretly taped
recordings of Fetullah Gülen, calling on his followers to penetrate into high positions
in the Turkish state ‘patiently and secretly’ and ‘not to surface until a certain point’,
were disclosed and created a major uproar in Turkey. While Fetullah Gülen dismissed
these accusations as mere slander and conspiracy,52 a year later, in August 2000,
Turkish prosecutors took the case to the State Security Court of Turkey.53 In March
2003 Fetullah Gülen was still being tried in absentia, accused of attempting to
overthrow the secular government of Turkey.54
All these incidents were received differently by Turkish elites and even created
conflicting views among them. In June 2000, for example, in a report prepared by
Turkey’s ambassadors to the Turkic republics for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the ambassadors stated their support for the schools associated with the Nurcu
community.55 Additionally, the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit continued to give
his support to the educational efforts of the Nurcu community. In March 2000, during
a visit to Albania, he visited one of the schools known to be financed by a member
of this community, and was reported to have expressed his appreciation to the school
administrators, ‘knowing that this may be criticised by other people’.56 On the other
hand, President Necdet Sezer, during his trip to Kazakhstan in October 2000, did not
visit one of these schools on the grounds that ‘private enterprises could not be visited
during an official state visit’.57 Furthermore, in an attempt to reduce the Turkish
state’s dependence on ‘private entrepreneurs’, Sezer asked the permission of Kazakh
President Nursultan Nazarbaev to establish schools that would be operated by the
Turkish Ministry of National Education.58 Sezer was also reported to have received
similar permission from Uzbekistan with which just a year earlier Turkey had
troubled relations.59 In yet another statement, Çay denied allegations that the plans to
establish schools that would be operated by the Turkish state aimed to undercut the
schools associated with the Nurcu community.60
The Turkish Ministry of National Education, on the other hand, started to take
special measures to prevent a repetition of the events in Uzbekistan. Although the
ministry is by law unable to intervene in the Turkish private schools opened abroad,
it decided to keep a close eye on their curricula and textbooks.61 Moreover, the
Turkish Higher Education Council, which organises the university entrance examina-
tions in Turkey, decided to exclude private universities connected with the Nurcu
community from their listings.62 Despite all these events in Uzbekistan and Turkey,
school closures were limited only to Uzbekistan and, very recently, to the Russian
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Federation. About ten institutions known to have ties with the Nurcu community have
been reported to have been closed down in Karachai-Cherkessia, Bashkortistan and
elsewhere around the Russian Federation on the grounds that the schools were ‘very
close to the Nurcu community, which has been pursuing a pan-Turkist and pan-Is-
lamist ideology’.63 Nevertheless, the educational enterprise of the Nurcu community,
which was estimated to spend around 1.5 billion dollars and believed to employ 7,000
teachers, according to 1998 estimates, continued to operate in 54 countries of the
world including Turkey.64
Apart from the schools connected with the Nurcu community, there were other
private schools established and operated by other foundations, like the Turkish World
Research Foundation, known to have pan-Turkic leanings. By early 2001 this
foundation had established two business administration institutes, one in Baku and
one in Celalabat, Kyrgyzstan, and one international relations institute, again in
Celalabat.65 The head of the foundation, Turan Yazgan, argued that these countries
were in dire need of good managers, and thus the priority of their foundation was to
establish business administration and international relations institutes.66 The language
of instruction in these institutes was Turkish and the teaching staff were Turkish
nationals. All these institutes accepted both local students and students from Turkey.
In September 2003 a total of 871 students attended all three institutes, 45 of whom
were Turkish.67 This foundation also established Turkish language departments within
various universities in Kazakhstan and Dagestan as well as high schools in Azerbai-
jan, Kazakhstan and Tatarstan and provided technical assistance to them.68 Just as in
the foundation’s other educational institutions, the language of instruction in these
high schools was Turkish. Textbooks were provided for the students free of charge,
and the education, as the website of the foundation describes, was based on Ismail
Gaspirinsky’s principle of ‘unification in language, thought and action, and expressing
this wherever possible’.69
Conclusion: any impact at all?
This article has described Turkey’s educational exchange campaign in the Turkic
Republics of the former Soviet Union and Eurasia in the past decade. The aim of this
campaign was to help create the next generation of elites familiar with Turkish culture
and language, as well as with the principles of a market economy. In other words, the
goal was a thorough cultural reorientation.
This campaign operated in two different ways. First, there were students, mostly at
the university level, who were invited to Turkey on scholarships from the Turkish
government; second there were schools, mostly at the secondary school level, that
were established in the Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union and in Eurasia
by the Turkish state and private parties. In this case, private schools, as described
above, outnumbered the state ones established and operated by the Turkish Ministry
of National Education. Both trends, inviting students on scholarships to Turkey and
taking Turkish education to these countries, illustrated the idea that educational
exchange could become one of the country’s most important foreign policy tools.
Moreover, the dominance of non-state actors, especially foundations and en-
TURKISH EDUCATION IN EURASIA 303
trepreneurs connected with the Nurcu and other communities, is a good example of
how non-state actors can be extensions of the foreign policy of a country when the
aims of the state and the non-state actors overlap to a certain degree.
In the end, however, Turkish educational endeavours, both public and private, were
not problem free. Over the years, the overall number of students coming from the
Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union on scholarships declined steadily. The
decline was due to financial as well as political reasons. Most of the time the stipends
were very small and were paid irregularly. The rift between the Uzbek and the
Turkish state caused by Uzbek allegations of fundamentalism became one of the
reasons for the withdrawal of Uzbek students from Turkey. Similar reasons were at
work in school closures in Uzbekistan as well. Nevertheless, Turkish elites frequently
state their keen and continuing interest in this educational exchange and have taken
measures to pursue it. In September 2002, for example, the Turkish Ministry of
National Education signed a protocol regarding the exchange of students between
Turkey and Kazakhstan,70 and in November 2002, in addition to the already existing
Turkish schools, the teaching of Turkish started at five different elementary schools
in Baku.71
What has been the overall impact of this exchange? The goal of this article was to
assess the intent of this educational exchange; its impact is beyond the scope of the
present study, and is a topic for future research. Has the goal of creating a stratum
of elites familiar with Turkey, Turkish culture and language as well as market
economy principles been achieved? It is doubtful whether a 10–12 year period is long
enough to make a very clear and all-encompassing assessment. Furthermore, this kind
of evaluation requires a massive amount of institutional and financial support.
Consequently, given the difficulties of doing an all-encompassing evaluation, data
gathered so far regarding the impact of this educational exchange initiated by the
Turkish state and private entrepreneurs have been either anecdotal or, at best, limited
in scope. Most of the anecdotal evidence comes from news reports based on the views
of various people commenting on the quality of these educational ties as well as the
success or failure of these institutions.72 There also have been several studies
involving the surveying of students studying in Turkish schools in Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, with an attempt at measuring the possible impact of
the education on their national identification. However, as stated before, these surveys
were very limited in scope, examining only a handful of students studying at Turkish
schools in only a couple of different countries. No matter how small these studies
were, the conclusion they arrived at was that these Turkish schools, public and
private, were instrumental in disseminating the idea of common origins with Turkey
and the Turkic republics where these studies were conducted.73 So far, no studies have
been conducted on the students who came to study in Turkey on scholarships
provided by the Turkish state. But the declining number of students coming to Turkey
every year, as well as the high drop-out rate, may possibly be interpreted as indicating
certain limits to this Great Student Exchange as well as to the goal of creating future
generations of elites in the newly independent states of Eurasia.
In sum, education can be used as one of the most direct means to mould the
political culture of a target country by attempting to create a generation of elites
familiar with and sympathetic to the culture and to the country that provides the
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education. However, it may still be too early to make a full-fledged assessment of the
effects of these educational ties. What this article illustrated was the intent of the
Turkish state to make education one of the tools of its foreign policy. Based on the
experience in its own history, Turkey was very well aware of this tool right from the
beginning and, as this article demonstrated, used this feature to its fullest ability to
create a ‘Turkic identity’.
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Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s (Leiden, New York, and Cologne, E. J. Brill, 1995),
p. 1.
3 Turkish Embassy.Org at Washington, DC, http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/region-
scentralasia.htm, accessed 12 September 2003.
4 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 36;
William A. Reed, ‘Curriculum as an Expression of National Identity’, Journal of Curriculum
Supervision, 15, 2, 2000, pp. 113–133: Carolyn P. Boyd, Historia Patria: Politics, History and
National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975 (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1997).
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6 Süleyman Demirel, ‘Cumhurbaşkani Sayin Süleyman Demirel’in TBMM’nin 20. Dönem 4.
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13 Avni Akyol, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanaklari, 29 April 1993, Session: 97/1; Ali
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18 Berberoğlu, Öbür Türkler: “Büyük Oyun” un Milliyetçi Süvarileri, pp. 120–127.
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1999, http://hurweb01.hurriyet.com.tr/hur/turk/99/06/22/gundem/03gun.htm, accessed 15 June 2001.
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58 Ibid.
59 ‘Kerimov and Cem Work to Thaw Turk–Uzbek Relations’, Turkish Daily News, 4 October
2000, www.turkishdailynews.com/old editions/10 04 00/for.htm#f4, accessed 24 March 2003.
Turkey has since tried to improve its relations with Uzbekistan. In 2001 Turkey granted $1.5 million
military aid to Uzbekistan and $610,000 in 2002. Turkey also trained Uzbek soldiers (‘Turkey
Equips, Trains Uzbek Military’, Turkish Daily News, 7 March 2002, http://
www.turkishdailynews.com/old editions/03 07 02/for.htm#f5, accessed 31 March 2003.
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